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For the Central Asian countries the dissolution of the Soviet Union led to economic 
disintegration as old coordination mechanisms disappeared and new national borders 
appeared. This paper analyses why it has been difficult to coordinate aid for regional 
cooperation projects (e.g., on the Aral Sea or trade facilitation) whose economic 
benefits appear positive. Bilateral aid flows to Central Asia have been dominated by 
geopolitical rather than economic considerations, and have been at best narrowly 
national in focus and at worst regionally divisive. Regional organizations composed of 
Central Asian countries and various neighbours have also competed rather than 
cooperated, so that the most plausible source of coordinated aid for regional cooperation 
projects is the multilateral agencies. 
A key role for aid donors is to provide technical assistance in analysing and explaining 
benefits, and how these affect various interests. Initial advantages which multilateral 
agencies had as impartial providers of technical advice were undermined in 1992-93 
when the IMF’s strong position in favour of retaining the ruble turned out to be 
…/. 
Keywords: aid, Central Asia, trade 
JEL classification: F35, F15, O18, R12  
The World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) was 
established by the United Nations University (UNU) as its first research and 
training centre and started work in Helsinki, Finland in 1985. The Institute 
undertakes applied research and policy analysis on structural changes 
affecting the developing and transitional economies, provides a forum for the 
advocacy of policies leading to robust, equitable and environmentally 
sustainable growth, and promotes capacity strengthening and training in the 
field of economic and social policy making. Work is carried out by staff 
researchers and visiting scholars in Helsinki and through networks of 
collaborating scholars and institutions around the world. 
www.wider.unu.edu publications@wider.unu.edu 
 
UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) 
Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, 00160 Helsinki, Finland 
 
Typescript prepared by Liisa Roponen at UNU-WIDER 
 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s). Publication does not imply 
endorsement by the Institute or the United Nations University, nor by the programme/project sponsors, of 
any of the views expressed. 
 
mistaken advice. In the 1990s aid directed to the Aral Sea problem produced few 
benefits because, despite the magnitude of the gross benefits from reversing the 
desiccation, littoral countries see differential benefits and costs; pure win-win situations 
are more likely from regional cooperation in trade facilitation. Subsequently the 
multilateral agencies have had a better focus, sharing priorities in the destination of aid 
and agreeing on a functional division of labour, but this has not yet translated into 
effective assistance for regional cooperation. 
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1 Introduction 
The five Central Asian countries became independent with the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union in December 1991. Four of the five countries, together with Azerbaijan, had been 
the poorest among the Soviet republics (Table 1), and over the next decade they all 
experienced a severe decline in output and living standards (Table 2).1 By the end of the 
century, Tajikistan had become one of the poorest countries in Asia.2 Development 
assistance was justified in terms of low and declining income levels and coordination of 
aid for regional cooperation was especially important to encourage revival and 
reorientation of trade. This paper analyses the record of delivering and coordinating aid 
to the Central Asian countries in the first decade and a half after they became 
independent. 
Provision of bilateral aid to the newly independent Central Asian countries was 
complicated by several factors. While Russia might have liked to retain its regional 
influence, it was constrained—at least until oil prices started to rise after 1999—by lack 
of resources. The USA and EU quickly established diplomatic relations with the new 
countries, but despite talk of a new ‘great game’ for political influence in the region, 
Central Asia had a low priority when it came to aid funds.3 As the poorest post-Soviet 
transition economies and the only Soviet successor states with Islamic majorities, there 
were concerns that the Central Asian countries and Azerbaijan might turn into extremist 
regimes if subjected to rapid economic change, but this consideration also had low 
priority in determining aid flows, at least until after the 2001 terrorist attacks in the 
USA. The significance of some Central Asian countries as suppliers of minerals and 
energy has influenced their external relations, and rising oil prices and large new 
                                                 
1   Although the World Bank estimates in Table 1 are a reasonable guide to the relative ranking of Soviet 
republics by living standards, the absolute dollar values for per capita GDP must be treated with 
caution due to the insoluble problems of the Soviet Union’s artificial relative prices. Since 
independence, the reliability of data is an issue throughout this region, but, apart from the war years in 
Tajikistan, the situation is clearly worst in Turkmenistan. It is important to stress that, while data 
reported by international institutions (such as the figures in Table 2) have been adjusted for 
definitional consistency, the raw data come from national sources, and international organizations 
have no way of correcting undisclosed collection or reporting biases. 
2   By 2000, Tajikistan with a national income per capita of US$180 was poorer than most of   
Sub-Saharan Africa or the poorest countries of Asia. At purchasing power parity (PPP) the Central 
Asian countries’ incomes are higher. Tajikistan’s 2000 GNI per capita at PPP was US$1090 (World 
Bank 2002a). Corresponding figures for the Kyrgyz Republic were US$270 and US$2540 (PPP), for 
Uzbekistan US$360 and US$2360 (PPP), for Turkmenistan US$750 and US$3820 (PPP), and for 
Kazakhstan US$1260 and US$5490 (PPP). By Maddison’s PPP estimates, Tajikistan’s 1998 per 
capita GDP of IUS$830 was about the same as that of Haiti or Bangladesh; only Afghanistan had 
lower per capita GDP in Asia, and in Africa only 13 of the 42 countries for which Maddison (2001: 
183-5) provides estimates had lower per capita GDP than Tajikistan. 
3   The European Union provided assistance mainly through its Tacis programme of technical assistance, 
but financial disbursements were small. Germany was expected to show particular interest in 
Kazakhstan because of the large German minority with right of abode in Germany, but in practice 
German attention was focused on Eastern Europe. In the early 1940s Stalin shipped ethnic Germans 
and Koreans from the western and eastern parts of the USSR to Kazakhstan lest they might act as a 
fifth column for German or Japanese military penetration; despite initial anticipation of Germany and 
Korean aid to Kazakhstan, official capital flows were never large and quickly dwindled. 2 
discoveries in the Caspian Basin raised the region’s profile after 2000, but the oil-
related financial flows came from the private sector.4 
Table 1 
Income per head, income distribution and poverty 
Republics of the USSR, 1989-90 
 Population  (million) 
mid-1990 




Poverty (% of 
population)b 1989  
        
USSR 289.3  2,870  0.289  11.1 
        
Kazak 16.8  2,600  0.289  15.5 
Kyrgyz 4.4  1,570  0.287  32.9 
Tajik 5.3  1,130  0.308  51.2 
Turkmen 3.7  1,690  0.307  35.0 
Uzbek 20.5  1,340  0.304  43.6 
        
Armenia 3.3  2,380  0.259  14.3 
Azerbaijan 7.2  1,640  0.328  33.6 
Georgia 5.5  2,120 0.292  14.3 
Belarus 10.3  3,110  0.238  3.3 
Moldova 4.4  2,390  0.258  11.8 
Russia 148.3  3,430  0.278  5.0 
Ukraine 51.9  2,500  0.235  6.0 
Estonia 1.6  4,170 0.299  1.9 
Latvia 2.7  3,590  0.274  2.4 
Lithuania 3.7  3,110  0.278  2.3 
Notes:  a  GNP per capita in US dollars computed by the World Bank's synthetic Atlas method;  
  b  Poverty = individuals in households with gross per capita income less than 75 rubles. 
Sources:  World Bank (1992: 3-4) for columns 1-2; Atkinson and Micklewright (1992: Table U13) based on 
Goskomstat data (HBS) for columns 3-4. 
Table 2 
Growth in real GDP 1989-2005, % 
   Kazakhstan   Kyrgyz Rep  Tajikistan   Turkmenistan   Uzbekistan  
  Part  A     
1989  0  8 -3 -7  4 
1990 0  3  -2  2  2 
1991  -13 -5 -7 -5 -1 
1992 -3  -19  -29  -5  -11 
1993  -9 -16 -11 -10  -2 
1994  -13 -20 -19 -17  -4 
1995 -8  -5  -13  -7  -1 
1996  1  7 -4 -7  2 
1997 2  10  2  -11  3 
1998  -2 2 5 5 4 
1999 2  4  4  16  4 
1999;  1989=100  63 63 44 64 94 
       Table  2  continues 
                                                 
4   The main government intervention has been in influencing decisions about pipeline routes from 
Central Asia. While Russia has tried to obstruct any new pipelines which would undermine its 
monopoly, the USA pushed routes to Turkey or through Afghanistan to South Asia and threatened 
sanctions against any company participating in pipeline projects through Iran. In 2005, China, 
frustrated by Russia’s preference for supplying Japan from its eastern oilfields, began construction of 
a pipeline to link Kazakhstan’s oilfields to the Chinese network. 3 
Table 2 (con’t) 
Growth in real GDP 1989-2007, % 
    Part  B     
1998  -2 2 5 7 4 
1999 3  4  4  17  4 
2000 10  5  8  19  4 
2001 14  5  10  20  4 
2002 10  0  9  16  4 
2003 9  7  10  17  4 
2004 9  7  11  17  8 
2005 10  0  7  10  7 
2006  11 3 8 9 7 
2007  9 6 9 9 8 
Notes:  2006 = preliminary actual figures from official government sources. Data for 2007 represent 
EBRD projections. 
Source:  EBRD (2001: 15) for Part A; EBRD (2007) for Part B.  
Absent substantial bilateral aid flows, much of the development assistance to Central 
Asia has come from multilateral institutions.5 In 1992 the Central Asian countries 
joined the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank, and over the next decade they joined the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).6 The contribution of 
the international financial institutions in the early 1990s was largely technical, focusing 
on monetary arrangements in 1992-93 (see section 3), although from mid-1993 they 
became more active in advocating a model of transition and supporting willing pupils 
with loans and grants (section 4). By the end of the 1990s, the transition from central 
planning was largely completed in Central Asia, even though most of the economies 
were not yet well-functioning market economies, and emphasis shifted to 
developmental issues. Within a wider consensus on the desirability of economic growth 
and on the positive relationship between trade and growth, there was growing 
recognition that the main barrier to trade-led growth in Central Asia was high trade 
costs, many of which could be reduced by regional cooperation. In this context the 
multilateral institutions declared their intentions of cooperating to assist in facilitating 
regional cooperation, but the record of multilateral initiatives has been unimpressive. 
The first section of the paper describes the Central Asian economies’ situation before 
and after the dissolution of the USSR, and the state of international thinking about aid in 
the early 1990s. Because the five countries followed diverse strategies towards 
economic reform, it was possible to discriminate among them according to their good or 
bad governance as well as according to their needs. The second section examines 
                                                 
5  Nongovernmental organizations and charities have also provided assistance, notably the Aga Khan’s 
Development Fund which has channelled aid especially to Tajikistan and also to the Kyrgyz Republic 
and Kazakhstan. Beyond economics, specialized UN agencies such as the High Commission for 
Refugees have provided valuable humanitarian assistance on the fringes of the conflicts in 
Afghanistan, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan, and agencies like UNICEF have become more active. Neither 
NGOs nor these agencies will be covered here. 
6  When the Soviet successor states joined the United Nations in July 1992, the Islamic successor states 
all opted to be in the Asian region. Membership of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia 
and the Pacific (ESCAP) was a prerequisite for access to the Asian Development Bank. Subsequently, 
and uniquely in the UN system, they were also permitted to join the UN Economic Commission for 
Europe which allowed them to join the EBRD. 4 
bilateral aid to national governments, and shows that it has been predominantly driven 
by geopolitical, rather than development, considerations. The next two sections cover 
multilateral aid, analysing the technical advice given over the currency issue in 1992-93 
in Section 3 and the support for a particular transition model in section 4. The fifth 
section focuses on regional cooperation projects which were clearly desirable uses of 
aid but where there were substantial problems of coordinating aid efforts. The final 
section draws conclusions. 
1 Background 
1.1  The Central Asian countries’ economies7 
Until the dissolution of the USSR, the Central Asian republics’ development strategies 
were determined in Moscow. The Central Asian republics were open economies, 
integrated into the Soviet Union’s division of labour but isolated from the global 
economy. Their main role was as producers of primary products, especially cotton, but 
also energy and minerals, and grain in northern Kazakhstan. Despite some complaints of 
being exploited by Moscow, there was little open discontent in Central Asia. Most 
Soviet citizens, but especially those in the isolated Central Asian region, were ill-
prepared for exposure in the 1990s to the extent to which their living standards now 
lagged those in high- or middle-income market economies, or for the emergence of 
conspicuous consumption and open poverty.  
With the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991, the Central Asian countries faced 
several major shocks. Nation-building started practically from scratch, and initially 
failed in Tajikistan. Economic disruption, already severe due to the end of central 
planning, was exacerbated by the cessation of substantial intra-USSR net transfers and 
by the breakdown of intra-USSR demand and supply links due to non-payment or non-
delivery of inputs. The negative impact of the collapse of the integrated Soviet economy 
was accentuated for the Central Asian countries by their landlocked location and 
inherited transport networks which made it difficult to reorient their trade. Even if the 
newly independent governments wished to take time to evaluate the situation, 
acceleration of economic reform was unavoidable as Russia’s price liberalization in 
January 1992 had to be followed by other countries using the common currency. At the 
same time the features of the ruble zone contributed to the acceleration of inflation from 
a triple-digit annual rate in 1991 to four-digit inflation in 1992 and 1993. 
Despite the similar economic structures, the national leaders adopted surprisingly 
diverse economic strategies. The Kyrgyz Republic embraced the advice from western 
institutions and advocates of rapid change and, within limits, its president fostered the 
emergence of the most liberal regime in the region. Kazakhstan in the early 1990s 
appeared to be accompanying the Kyrgyz Republic on a liberal path, but the president 
became more autocratic as the decade progressed and the economy became dominated by 
a small group of people who controlled the media and the banks. Uzbekistan retained a 
tightly controlled political system, but with nothing resembling the personality cult of 
Turkmenistan, and its economic reforms were modest. In Turkmenistan the president had 
                                                 
7  This section is based on Pomfret (1995; 2006) which review the situation in the early years after 
independence and in the period 1995-2005, respectively. 5 
absolute personal power and minimized economic change. Tajikistan was the only one of 
the five countries not to evolve peacefully from Soviet republic to independent state under 
unchanged leadership; the bloody civil war of 1992-97 dominated political developments 
and delayed implementation of a serious and consistent economic strategy. 
The five countries’ economic performance since independence has differed (Table 2) to 
some extent reflecting policy choices although since 2000 the comparative situation has 
been dominated by the increase in world energy prices. This is especially true for the 
two largest economies; during the 1990s Kazakhstan’s output performance was inferior 
to Uzbekistan’s, but since the turn of the century Kazakhstan, as a significant oil 
producer which by coincidence also had major new discoveries coming on line, has 
experienced an economic boom while Uzbekistan’s economy appears to stagnate. For 
Turkmenistan, with its abundant natural gas reserves, the energy boom has alleviated 
pressures to change the country’s poor economic policies, but the opaque statistical 
situation in Turkmenistan makes any definite judgment hazardous. Both gradual-
reforming Uzbekistan and rapid-reforming Kyrgyz Republic have enjoyed less 
spectacular growth, and have clearly lower living standards than Kazakhstan. Tajikistan 
is even worse placed, as the economy has recovered but slowly from a very deep trough. 
By the turn of the century, the national economies, with the possible exception of 
Turkmenistan’s, had changed substantially from the centrally planned economy of the 
Soviet era and all were, in one form or another, a market-based economy. Kazakhstan, 
despite false steps in the 1990s, remains the most likely to succeed. Its new elite, based 
on an unfair and distorted privatization process, is now keen to establish a rule of law in 
order to protect its economic gains, and favourable institutional developments are likely. 
Meanwhile, the hard infrastructure of oil pipelines is starting to improve and provide 
Kazakhstan with alternative outlets for its dominant exports.8 At the other extreme, with 
a regime that is resistant to change, Turkmenistan faces grim economic conditions, and 
the longer-term prospects depend upon the nature of the political succession after the 
death in December 2006 of President Niyazov, or Turkmenbashi the Great, as he 
preferred to be known. Political factors are also critical in Tajikistan, where 
establishment of effective public administration is a necessary precondition for 
progress. Even with that condition met, the economic prospects are not good for 
Tajikistan or for the Kyrgyz Republic, both of which are poor landlocked countries.9 In 
the 1990s Uzbekistan was economically the most successful of all Soviet successor 
states and in day-to-day matters the economy remains fairly well-managed but, if poor 
economic policies in the key interrelated areas of managed trade, low farmgate prices, 
reliance on extracting agricultural rents for government revenues and protection of 
import-substituting industries are not addressed, Uzbekistan’s economy could easily slip 
into the stagnation familiar from many import-substituting countries of the 1950s and 
1960s. In Uzbekistan as elsewhere in Central Asia, perhaps more fundamental is the 
                                                 
8  The opening of the private CPC pipeline to the Black Sea in 2001 provided the first alternative to the 
Russian state monopoly, and in 2005 completion of a pipeline from Baku to Ceyhan on Turkey’s 
Mediterranean coast and construction of the first stage of a link from Kazakhstan to China’s pipeline 
network further increased Kazakhstan’s options. 
9   The consequences of landlockedness for Central Asian countries are analysed by Raballand (2005). 
The Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan are separated from China by some of the highest mountains in 
the world, and in any other direction the two countries are double-landlocked, requiring transit 
through at least two other countries to reach the open sea. 6 
question of whether an autocratic and repressive political regime is consistent with a 
flourishing market-based economy; China’s example says yes, but that has not been 
easy to replicate. To sum up the situation for Central Asia as a whole, despite much 
shared background and common initial conditions, the five countries, and especially the 
two larger economies, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, have been moving along differing 
trajectories and that is likely to continue. 
1.2  Thinking about aid in 1991 
The 1980s were a decade of rethinking foreign aid, reflected first in stricter 
conditionality and then in cutbacks, especially by the USA and UK whose governments 
distrusted the potential of public expenditure to improve living standards. Mosley 
(1986) highlights the micro-macro paradox that, although ex post evaluation suggested 
that aid-assisted projects yield net social benefits, at the macro level any positive effects 
of aid evaporate in cross-country regressions. By 1991 there was neither abundant 
funding for aid nor much intellectual commitment to directing capital to poor countries’ 
governments, and any claims by the poor new countries of Central Asia for aid would 
run into opposition from other poor countries which would resist any reduction in their 
share of the shrinking aid pie.  
The conventional wisdom on economic development had moved far away from the 
focus on capital formation of the development economics pioneers of the 1940s and 
1950s. By 1990 the emphasis had shifted to human capital rather than physical capital 
and to incorporating institutions and political economy. Thus aid to corrupt regimes was 
money down the drain or, even worse, it would reinforce the hold of the government 
which was the source of the problem. These ideas were widespread among the young 
economists assigned to the Central Asia or Mongolia desks in international agencies or 
working in the field.10 
The phenomenon of transition from central planning to more market-oriented 
economies was, of course, not new in 1992 and the ‘Washington consensus’ on the 
desirability of rapid economic reform was already in place.11 On broader questions of 
transition strategy, the Muslim successor states took backstage to Eastern Europe, the 
Baltics and Russia and Ukraine which were either more dynamic or more important to 
the west. Applying the Washington consensus to Central Asia was also complicated by 
the lack of a suitable model, as the initially more reformist Kazakhstan became more 
autocratic. Only after the Kyrgyz Republic had established its own currency in May 
1993 was this poor and poorly endowed state adopted as the torchbearer of 
liberalization in the region (section 4). 
                                                 
10 One example was Peter Boone, who was based in Mongolia as the USSR was disintegrating and 
whose paper published in 1996 became a standard reference (or straw-man) on how the effectiveness 
of aid is nullified when it encourages rent seeking rather than productive behaviour. 
11  The term Washington consensus was coined by John Williamson in 1989 to cover the lowest common 
denominator of advice being given by the IMF and World Bank to Latin American countries. In its 
original form the ‘consensus’ emphasized fiscal discipline with low marginal tax rates and public 
expenditure focused on human capital formation, trade and interest rate liberalization and a 
competitive exchange rate, privatization and deregulation, and secure property rights. In the transition 
context it became identified with rapid price liberalization and macroeconomic stabilization. 
Williamson (2000) examines the evolution of the term. 7 
2 Bilateral  aid 
Bilateral financial aid for the Muslim successor states to the Soviet Union was minimal 
during the 1990s. As the USSR dissolved, the southern republics were not high on any 
western country’s priority list. Turkey and Iran briefly filled a vacuum, but neither did 
much and early identification of their roles as proxies for secularism and militant Islam 
proved false. 
Russia remained engaged in Tajikistan, primarily through military aid, but   
overall Russia experienced a huge loss of influence in its ‘near abroad’ during the   
1990s. Russia’s main diplomatic initiative, the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS), was ineffectual, and the 1994-96 Chechnya conflict exposed Russia’s military 
weakness. Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova gradually became more vigorous 
in coordinating resistance to Russian plans for military bases in the Caucasus and in 
October 1997 the four presidents issued a joint communiqué, establishing a formal 
group (known as GUAM).12 Uzbekistan shared many of the four GUAM countries’ 
interests and in April 1999 Uzbekistan formally joined the group which then became 
known as GUUAM. Turkmenistan also moved firmly out of the Russian sphere of 
interest, and even obtained formal recognition of its neutrality in a 1995 resolution of 
the UN General Assembly. On the other hand, the government of Tajikistan remained 
tied to Russia for military support, and Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic signed a 
regional trade agreement with Russia and Belarus.13  
The USA has been the most active western power in the region, and its actions 
especially since the mid-1990s, have been driven by strategic rather than ideological 
considerations. US policy shifted from initial indifference to warmer support for allies 
in containing Russia’s southern flank, and the emergence of the GUUAM axis led to 
growing US support for and friendliness towards Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan. The USA 
began holding joint military exercises with Uzbekistan in 1998, education opportunities 
in the USA were increased, and in general US-Uzbekistan relations became warmer, 
although the détente was associated with technical rather than financial assistance. 
Turkmenistan and Tajikistan were ignored on both geopolitical and economic grounds, 
as were to a large extent the more liberal Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan.14  
                                                 
12  Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova had been the most reluctant members of the CIS, joining only under 
heavy Russian pressure in late 1993 or early 1994, and together with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
participated least in CIS structures (Sakwa and Webber 1999). 
13   The Union of Four was joined by Tajikistan in 1999, and in 2000 was rebadged as the Eurasian 
Economic Community with the formal goal of a customs union. Since the Kyrgyz Republic joined the 
WTO in 1998, its bound tariff rates are well below levels acceptable to Russia as a common external 
tariff and it is unlikely that Kazakhstan would raise its tariffs to the Russian level. Tumbarello (2005: 
Table 4) estimates substantial negative net welfare effects to both Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz 
Republic from forming a customs union in which Russia sets the external tariff. 
14 Despite gaining short-term diplomatic benefits from an early decision to relinquish its nuclear 
weapons, Kazakhstan remained suspect in the west due to the strong Russian connection which 
includes military bases in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan’s situation is complicated by the presence of a 
large Russian minority (two-fifths of the republic’s population in the 1989 Soviet census), mainly in 
northern Kazakhstan, with a potential for secession or irredentist claims by Russia. Among the Central 
Asian countries, Kazakhstan retained the strongest trade links with Russia; reliance on mineral or 
energy products supplied to manufacturers in Russia by pipelines or rail links made changes in the 8 
A surprising feature of western aid to the region in 1991-2001 is that it was almost 
totally unaffected by the spectre of Islamic fundamentalism. Early 1990s accounts 
foresaw proxy competition between Turkey, as the champion of secularism, and Iran, as 
the champion of Islamic law, but after some early gestures such as the establishment of 
credit lines or cultural links, the influence of these regional powers has been small. Iran, 
Pakistan, Turkey, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan and the five Central Asian countries are the 
members of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) which may have had some 
influence in turning potential conflict between the first three countries into more 
cooperative actions, but the influence of ECO has been small (Pomfret 1999). President 
Karimov has represented Uzbekistan as a pillar of secularism, supporting anti-
fundamentalist forces in Tajikistan and northern Afghanistan and, especially in 1995-96, 
denouncing Iran. Uzbekistan was one of the few countries to back the 1995 US trade 
embargo of Iran, but this did not lead to much other than the surprising spectacle of 
Uzbekistan and Israel being the sole supporters of the USA in United Nations voting. 
Serious US rapprochement towards Uzbekistan in the late 1990s was in the common 
cause of containing Russia rather than against Islamic fundamentalism; geopolitics 
appears to dominate ideology in this context.  
Western powers stayed out of the Tajik conflict and, more surprisingly, out of the 
Afghan civil war. The USA in particular was ambivalent until 1997, urging 
‘engagement’ with the Taliban leaders rather than the hardline pursued towards Iran 
(Starr 1997: 30); Pakistani and Saudi support for the Taliban regime and Iranian support 
for the opposition tilted the scales towards non-intervention. The Uzbek warlords in 
northern Afghanistan received no western support, and their stronghold of Mazar-i-
Sharif fell to the Taliban in 1997-98. When the US oil company Unocal lobbied for 
support for a pipeline from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan to Pakistan in 1997, it looked 
briefly as though US recognition of the Taliban government might be on the cards, but 
as Taliban atrocities against their opponents and treatment of women received greater 
publicity, the US government backed away from Unocal’s pipeline and all western 
governments shrank from any show of support for the Taliban. US feelings were 
heightened by the Taliban’s refusal to extradite Osama bin Laden after the 1998 
bombing of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, but no punitive action was taken 
against the Taliban until after September 2001. 
The events of September 2001 provided the catalyst for US-led military action to 
overthrow Afghanistan’s Taliban government. All of the Central Asian leaders, along 
with those of Russia and China, gave verbal support to the US-led war on terrorism. 
Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic went further by providing material assistance such 
as making airbases available to the US military, and Tajikistan allowed overflight by US 
military aircraft. These developments upped the international perceptions of Central 
Asia’s strategic significance. Russia, although officially supporting the USA, attempted 
to reassert its own influence. President Putin tried to obtain recognition of Russian 
hegemony over Central Asia and the Caucasus as a quid pro quo for his acquiescence in 
the expansion of NATO in eastern Europe at the November 2002 Prague summit. 
President Karimov of Uzbekistan, however, had a fairly high profile at Prague, meeting 
President Jacques Chirac and Secretary of State Colin Powell, who praised ‘the practical 
                                                                                                                                               
direction of trade difficult, although after experiencing contagion from the 1998 Russian crisis, 
Kazakhstan has diversified its trade in the twenty-first century—a process helped by the oilboom.  9 
actions of Uzbekistan in the international fight against terrorism’.15 Although the 
general perception in 2002 was of a widening of the fissure between those Central Asian 
countries more and less amenable to Russian influence in the region, this proved short-
lived. 
After the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 there was a general shift towards closer 
relations with Russia and to a lesser extent China. This was especially clear in the case 
of the most authoritarian countries, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which began to have 
concerns over whether the USA might one day use their own human rights abuses as an 
excuse for military action. Russia and China were less concerned about human rights 
issues, and opposed foreign intervention in what they considered domestic matters.16 
Apart from their bilateral links, the main diplomatic lever used by Russia and China was 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) which has since 2001 included all of the 
Central Asian countries except Turkmenistan.17 The SCO is notionally a regional 
economic arrangement, but there has been no move towards creating preferential trading 
among SCO members.  
The post-2003 Russian and Chinese effort towards Central Asia has been driven more 
by commercial strategy rather than aid as it is normally defined. This was already 
apparent in Kazakhstan, where LUKoil has invested US$3 billion since the turn of the 
century and the China National Petroleum Corporation has also made substantial 
investments. After the June 2004 SCO summit, Uzbekistan and Russia signed a strategic 
partnership agreement and China announced plans to extend US$900 million in loans 
and credits to Central Asian countries. In October 2004 Russia wrote off US$250 
million of Tajikistan’s official debt in return for military bases and large Russian 
companies paid cash for shares to gain control over some of the commanding heights of 
Tajikistan’s economy.18 In March 2006 Gazprom negotiated an oil-for-gas deal to take 
a controlling stake in developing four gasfields in Tajikistan. UES and Gazprom are 
completing two power plants and upgrading the energy distribution systems in the 
                                                 
15 Quoted at www.press-service.uz/eng/vizits_eng/ve21112002.htm by the press service of the President 
of Uzbekistan. President Rahmonov of Tajikistan also publicized improved ties with France and the 
USA, making visits to the two countries in December 2002 as a signal of displeasure with Russia’s 
deportation of Tajik guestworkers. By contrast, on 18-19 February 2003 President Nazarbayev of 
Kazakhstan, facing US and EU criticisms of his regime’s corruption and human rights record, made 
an official visit to Russia, where he is not criticized for such things. 
16 Both countries have minorities (notably in Chechnya in Russia, and in Tibet and Xinjiang in China) 
who may be considered repressed by outsiders, but who are seen as rebels and often as terrorists by 
the national governments. 
17 The organizations origins were a 1996 meeting of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic 
and Tajikistan intended to demilitarize borders. At a summit in Dushanbe in July 2000, the Five, with 
Uzbekistan as an observer, took up a number of economic issues, and changed the group’s name to the 
Shanghai Forum. At the June 2001 summit, Uzbekistan became the sixth member and the group was 
renamed the SCO. At the 2004 summit Mongolia was admitted as an observer. 
18  Rusal undertook to invest US$600 million in an aluminium smelter and US$560 in the Rugun hydro 
dam, and UES committed to invest US$250 million in the Sangtuda hydroelectric power station with 
an agreement to invest a further US$480 million. These numbers should be seen in the context of a 
country whose GDP at market prices was little over one billion dollars. They can also be contrasted 
with aid to Tajikistan in 2004 from the main western donors (USA US$48 million, EU US$24 million, 
Switzerland US$15 million and Japan US$6 million) or from the multilateral agencies (IDA US$34 
million, IMF US$20 million and ADB US$17 million), as reported by the DAC at www.oecd.org. 10 
Kyrgyz Republic. Gazprom is also a shareholder in RosUkrEnergo, the company which 
after the Russia-Ukraine gas war at the start of 2006 ended up becoming the sole 
supplier of Turkmenistan’s natural gas to Ukraine. This dependence pushed 
Turkmenistan’s president to seek alternative partners, including China, with which he 
signed an agreement in April 2006 to supply 30 billion cubic metres of gas a year from 
2009 to 2039 in return for Chinese assistance in constructing a gas pipeline which will 
tie in with an oil and gas pipeline network from Kazakhstan to China, the first segment 
of which was built in 2005. All of the companies mentioned in this paragraph, even if 
notionally joint stock companies, appear to act as agents of national policy. 
Central Asia’s energy and mineral wealth has attracted western interest. In contrast to 
official development assistance and military support, western private capital flows have 
gone overwhelmingly to the energy sector, and hence to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, 
rather than the other three Central Asian countries. Chevron’s Tengiz joint venture in 
western Kazakhstan, negotiated during the Gorbachev era, was the largest foreign 
investment project in the USSR. Other oil projects have involved most of the North 
American and European majors. All of these links have, however, led to commercial 
capital flows rather than to aid.19 
In sum, bilateral aid to Central Asia has been modest in total, dominated by geopolitical 
rather than developmental considerations, and driven by competition among donors.20 It 
has been targeted to favoured national governments and has been devoid of efforts to 
promote regional cooperation for economic development. Russia, in particular, has used 
regional trade agreements to further its political agenda, but these have had little 
economic impact. There has been little concern for the efficiency of aid delivery, and in 
many cases military assistance outweighs developmental assistance.21 
3 The  ruble  zone 
One of the first questions facing the new independent states at the end of 1991 was 
whether to introduce national currencies.22 This was a region-wide issue with obvious 
benefits from coordination; each individual decision to issue a national currency would 
reduce the ruble’s value as a common currency to remaining members of the ruble zone. 
It was also an issue on which Central Asian policymakers, with almost no knowledge of 
                                                 
19 The western companies are driven by profitability and are not instruments of state policy in the same 
way as the large Russian and Chinese companies appear to be. They have a technical edge, e.g., a 
reason for the original involvement of Chevron was its technical expertise. It is likely that Russian or 
Chinese companies may not have the technical capability to exploit the geologically difficult offshore 
oilfields in the northern Caspian. 
20 The aid data in Table 3 are not very helpful in this context, because (apart from the usual reservations 
about donor-reported aid data) they report only aid from OECD countries. The two poorest countries, 
the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, are the two largest recipients on a per capita basis, but the   
Table 3 numbers for these countries are dominated by multilateral aid. 
21 In July 2004, citing human rights violations, the US State Department announced a US$18 million cut 
in US aid, but in the next month, as Defence Secretary Rumsfeld visited Afghanistan, the chairman of 
the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Richard Meyers, visited Tashkent and announced a US$21 million 
increase in US military assistance, over the US$39 million already committed, to Uzbekistan. 
22 This section draws on Pomfret (1996: 118-29; 2002). 11 
macroeconomic policymaking, turned to external sources for technical assistance. 
Coordination of technical assistance was not a problem, as the IMF had obvious 
expertise on monetary arrangements and other multilateral institutions had not yet 
established a significant presence in Central Asia. 
Already in 1991 intra-USSR trade had been severely disrupted and the drift to barter 
accelerated in 1992. The Baltic countries were clearly heading along a path towards 
breaking Soviet political links at all costs, but the remaining Soviet successor states 
which had formed the CIS, were concerned with bolstering existing economic relations 
and preservation of a common currency was seen as a bulwark against adverse 
economic tendencies. Thus, the issue was associated with the desire for economic 
stability within the CIS. The desire for stability may have been shared by western 
policymakers, but western input into the debate over the currency issue in 1992 was on 
a technical rather than an ideological or geo-political basis. Although there may have 
been some attempts to coordinate technical assistance, the lead, given the nature of the 
issue, was taken by the IMF. 
Western advice on monetary and exchange rate arrangements within the CIS was 
initially couched in terms of the theory of optimum currency areas. Because there were 
no obvious breaks in factor mobility within the CIS and internal trade far outweighed 
trade with outsiders, the CIS appeared to be an optimum currency area, and 
conventional wisdom was strongly in favour of retaining the ruble zone after the 
dissolution of the USSR. Max Corden’s report for the UNDP/World Bank Trade 
Expansion Programme, with some caveats, recommended creation of a ruble zone and 
specifically pointed to the Central Asian countries as the ones for which the argument 
was likely to be strongest: 
If a republic is small, if the argument for fixing the exchange rate to the ruble is 
strong because trade with Russia is expected to dominate the country's trade for 
a long time, and if Russia is expected to succeed in stabilizing its economy, 
then the case for going all the way into a monetary union with Russia becomes 
strong. Perhaps these conditions apply for the central Asian republics. If the 
intention is to maintain a fixed exchange rate indefinitely, it is better to lock it 
in through an institutional arrangement and thus avoid any foreign exchange 
speculation (Corden 1992a: 14-5).23 
The first Economic Reviews of CIS countries published by the IMF in spring 1992 
repeated the policy recommendation that the Central Asian countries should remain 
within the ruble zone.24 The Central Asian countries followed this advice in 1992.  
The advice was flawed because the ruble zone’s institutional arrangements encouraged 
an inflationary monetary policy. Russia controlled the currency issue, but, because all 
                                                 
23 Max Corden’s influence was large because of his academic stature as one of the leaders in 
international economics over the last four decades and because in 1991-2 he was working for the 
Johns Hopkins University in Washington DC and had connections with both the IMF and World 
Bank. His May 1992 World Bank working paper contains essentially the same quotation (Corden 
1992b: 27). 
24 The argument was set out in IMF (1992a), where introduction of new currencies was discouraged on 
the grounds that (i) macroeconomic stability should be achieved first and (ii) intra-CIS trade would be 
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the Soviet successor states retained control over domestic credit creation and because 
there was no balancing mechanism for inter-country trade, no institution could exert 
effective monetary control. During the first half of 1992 the increase in the money 
supply was less pronounced because the Russian government pursued a reform 
programme supported by fairly restrictive monetary policy. The tight monetary policy 
encouraged Russian enterprises to sell to other ruble-zone members, and the growth of 
Russia's trade surplus drew rubles away from the deficit countries. Some ruble-zone 
members issued parallel currencies to alleviate the cash shortage, and the proliferation 
of parallel currencies with varying degrees of inconvertibility plus the increasing trade 
imbalances eroded the trade-facilitating benefit of having a common currency. Trade 
between ruble-zone countries was disrupted by delays in payments, and more generally 
there was a shortage of cash which affected both domestic and intra-zone trade. The 
situation deteriorated after June 1992 when growing opposition in the Russian 
parliament forced the replacement of the Central Bank chairman by a chairman 
committed to supporting state enterprises through a looser credit policy. Inflation 
accelerated as enterprises and governments throughout the ruble zone faced soft budget 
constraints. Each country individually had little incentive to restrict money creation, 
because they would reap the benefit from issuing money but only bear a fraction of the 
cost (in higher zone-wide inflation). 
Between June and November 1992, the Baltic countries and Ukraine abandoned the 
ruble in favour of national currencies. At the October 1992 Bishkek summit of the CIS, 
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan signed an agreement to establish a single monetary system and coordinate 
macroeconomic policies. Turkmenistan did not sign the agreement, but continued to use 
the ruble. However, the Bishkek agreement failed to create effective mechanisms for 
money creation, and it did not exclude the emission of parallel currencies.25 
Renegotiating the ruble zone’s institutional framework could not be solved quickly 
enough, and the IMF’s plan of establishing a fund to support new currencies after 
macroeconomic stabilization had been achieved was unrealistically slow.26 Although 
the Central Asian countries were the firmest advocates of retaining a common currency 
with Russia, even they found that membership in an inherently inflationary ruble zone 
was undesirable. The Central Asian countries began to make physical preparation for 
issuing national currencies; by spring 1993, the banknotes had been printed and were in 
their vaults. The printing of ruble notes with the Russian flag instead of Lenin’s head 
created the impression that Russia itself was introducing a national currency and might 
declare the old ruble notes worthless, and the heightened political uncertainty in Russia 
after March added to nervousness about Russia’s intentions.27 
                                                 
25  Armenia, Belarus and Moldova had all introduced parallel currencies earlier in 1992 (as had the then 
non-CIS members, Azerbaijan and Georgia), leaving the Central Asian countries as the only non-
Russian CIS members not to have issued some form of parallel currency by the end of 1992 
26    The IMF was reconsidering its position by October 1992 in light of Russia’s lack of monetary 
discipline. See IMF (1992b: 363). Odling-Smee and Pastor (2002) provide a more sympathetic 
account of the IMF’s role. 
27 Russia’s role was crucial because it controlled two inducements for other countries to remain in the 
ruble zone despite the hyperinflation: favourable ruble-denominated raw material prices and credit. 
Although officials from the Central Asian countries complained about paying the one per cent service 
charge on ruble notes levied by the Russian central bank plus 20 per cent interest on banknotes 
provided on credit, the interest rate was negative in real terms. During the first five months of 1993, it 13 
Physical problems of shipping banknotes which tended to arrive in large quantities at 
irregular intervals, added to the uncertainty over what the Russian central bank was 
doing. After a lengthy period of non-delivery, the Kyrgyz Republic received a shipment 
of 21 billion rubles at the beginning of April 1993. When these notes were released over 
the next five weeks, they roughly doubled the currency supply in the republic. The 
monetary uncertainty was exacerbated in the Kyrgyz Republic when Russia started to 
exert pressure for settlement of inter-enterprise debts and threatened not to provide any 
more credit. This appears to have been the catalyst for the Kyrgyz Republic to issue its 
national currency on 10 May 1993.28 
The Kyrgyz Republic received immediate support from the multilateral institutions. On 
May 12 the IMF's Executive Board approved a SDR 16.125 million (US$23 million) 
loan under the Systemic Transformation Facility which had been set up less than three 
weeks earlier, and a SDR 27.09 million (US$39 million) stand-by credit. The next day 
the World Bank announced its first credit to the Kyrgyz Republic of US$60 million 
through its soft loan arm, the International Development Agency (IDA). Co-financing 
of US$70 million was promised by Japan, the Netherlands and Switzerland. These were 
the first substantial amounts of western aid to an Islamic Soviet successor state, and 
were also connected to the emergence of the Kyrgyz Republic as the regional showcase 
for economic liberalism analysed in the next section. 
In June 1993 Russia adopted a tougher line on credit towards ruble-zone countries. 
Negotiations with Kazakhstan broke down because Russia wanted settlement of 
intergovernmental debts (where it was the creditor), but would not link this to inter-
enterprise debts (where Russian enterprises were debtors to Kazakhstan). The 
Kazakhstan government talked of opening direct negotiations with Asian republics of 
the Russian Federation, and the Russian central bank cut off the ruble supply, causing 
                                                                                                                                               
became increasingly obvious that Russia was using credit access for political ends. Fears that Russia 
might use its creditor status for political leverage were highlighted by Azerbaijan’s experience 
(Pomfret 1996: 103-17). Although the manat was introduced as a parallel currency in August 1992, it 
represented only a small proportion of the currency in circulation by year’s end. As the military 
conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh escalated, culminating in the Armenian invasion in April, the 
Russian central bank ceased granting credits to Azerbaijan and the emission of rubles practically 
ceased after March. Emissions of manat increased to finance the war, the ruble began to trade at a 
premium to the official exchange rate, and rubles effectively disappeared from circulation; during the 
first five months of 1993 about three-fifths of the rubles issued in Azerbaijan left the country, mostly 
converted into goods from other ruble-zone countries. The manat had de facto left the ruble zone by 
June 1993, as hyperinflation peaked and the government was overthrown in a coup which led to the 
return to power of a Brezhnev-era leader. 
28 The failure of education about the impact of issuing national currencies was not restricted to 
policymakers in Central Asia. The western press reaction was surprisingly negative, and as with the 
introduction of other new currencies (e.g., The Financial Times, London, 15 May 1992, had described 
the introduction of the Latvian currency as ‘a suicidal step’ which would precipitate further collapse 
of trade with Russia) the som’s introduction was predicted to lead to trade disruption (‘Out of Steppe’ 
was the headline in the Far Eastern Economic Review). The Wall Street Journal ran a story on 
resistance to internal acceptability of the new currency, but this difficulty had disappeared within a 
week. The Economist also took a negative track with its headline ‘Battle of the Som’. In fact, there 
was no major disruption of intra-CIS trade; Uzbekistan closed its border with the Kyrgyz Republic 
and stopped bank transfers between the two countries on the day the som was issued, while 
Kazakhstan kept trade flowing by granting credit to its neighbour, but these differing reactions by the 
Kyrgyz Republic’s two larger neighbours are explained by political rather than by economic 
considerations. 14 
currency shortages in Kazakhstan in early July. On July 26 the IMF announced a US$86 
million credit to Kazakhstan under the Systemic Transformation Facility, obviously in 
the knowledge that the country was likely to be adopting its own currency soon. 
On July 24 the fears of Russian invalidation of pre-1993 ruble notes were realized. No 
other ruble-zone members were informed of the decision, nor was the IMF which had a 
mission in Moscow earlier in the week. Apart from the financial losses suffered by 
those who could not convert their old notes into new notes at the one-for-one rate, this 
episode destroyed trust in the Russian central bank. Between August and November the 
ruble zone unravelled in a more or less chaotic fashion. On August 19 President 
Niyazov announced that Turkmenistan would introduce the manat on November 1st. At 
a September 1993 summit in Moscow, Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan 
and Kazakhstan once again reaffirmed their commitment to a renewed ruble zone, but 
the monetary institutions were not specified. In October suppression of the 
parliamentary opposition to President Yeltsin gave reformers the upper hand in Russia 
(the complete freeing of bread prices was a symbolic step which underlined the renewed 
price liberalization), and at the same time Russia was moving towards a more federative 
budget which would reduce the central government's ability to grant technical credits to 
CIS partners. These developments made the ruble zone less attractive to Uzbekistan, 
whose government was reluctant to reform prices, and to Kazakhstan, for whom 
reduction in Russian credits would remove the main carrot for staying in the ruble zone. 
On October 31 President Nazarbayev announced that Kazakhstan would introduce its 
own currency within the next two to three months. Following Nazarbayev’s 
announcement, the currency markets of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan went into total 
confusion.29  
The ruble zone collapsed in November 1993. On November 5 President Nazarbayev 
issued a decree freezing most bank accounts immediately, and a week later he 
announced that the national currency would be introduced on November 15. Uzbekistan 
issued the sum coupon also on November 15. After Armenia introduced the dram on 
November 22 and Moldova the leu on November 29, Tajikistan, where the main 
medium of exchange was still the old Soviet rubles which were no longer accepted 
anywhere else, was effectively in its own currency area.  
The currency issue dominated the first two years of the Central Asian countries’ 
independent existence. With hindsight, there was a clear feeling that mistakes had been 
made and that the suffering due to the hyperinflation of 1992-94 had been exacerbated 
because no serious attempt to control inflation could be undertaken until after national 
currencies had been established. Even at the time, the monetary confusion and its 
negative impact on economic activity were palpable. Some of this was exacerbated by 
                                                 
29 Old (pre-1993) rubles, no longer valid in Russia or in Turkmenistan after 1 November, flooded into 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan as holders saw the conversion to new national currencies as their last 
opportunity to get rid of potentially worthless banknotes. Traders were unwilling to accept old notes, 
despite their continuing official status and market exchange rates (against new rubles or against 
dollars) dropped rapidly. Uzbekistan announced that it would form a monetary union with 
Kazakhstan, confirming suspicions that Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan had a secret agreement that if they 
left the ruble zone they would do so in unison, although Kazakhstan denied that a monetary union 
would be formed. When the two countries introduced their national currencies, the differing par values 
were a clear signal that monetary coordination, if it was ever intended, had not carried through to 
implementation. 15 
the national governments’ indecision, reflected in the futile attempt to maintain the 
ruble zone as late as September 1993, and the lack of reasonable preparation by the 
governments of Uzbekistan which issued miserable temporary coupons in November 
1993 and only brought out a credible national currency in July 1994, or Tajikistan 
which introduced the Tajik ruble in May 1995 and then replaced it by a new currency, 
the somoni, in 2000 but in this setting, it was easy to pass the blame to bad IMF advice. 
Both Russia and the IMF, and other multilateral institutions by association, suffered 
from the episode. In Central Asia, where Kazakhstan had been a solid supporter of 
continued union and where Uzbekistan and Tajikistan still looked to Russia, the 
currency-related events of the summer and autumn of 1993 generated frustration with 
and loss of trust in Russia. Western influence was still far behind Russia’s in 1993, but a 
potential vacuum was emerging. Although its position had been largely driven by 
impartial economic theory, there was a suspicion that institutions like the IMF had been 
supporting Russian hegemony and inhibiting national development of the new states.30 
More importantly, the outcome undermined the reputation of western economics, 
especially on macroeconomic issues. 
The IMF and the World Bank have difficulty reconciling the pressures for a single 
‘company line’ on key policy issues, with the inherent imprecision of answers to major 
economic questions. In January 1992 it was not obvious whether the ruble zone should 
be maintained and, if so, by which countries and for how long, and the analytical 
problem was exacerbated by the IMF’s lack of regional expertise.31 In the first half of 
1992, it would have been better to air pros and cons of a common currency rather than 
trying to present a unified front, and to indicate to national policymakers that in a novel 
and highly unstable setting the best course of action was uncertain. Of course, it is 
difficult to be a two-handed economist when policymakers want definite answers, but 
the IMF did not try, and the representatives on the spot often did nothing to discourage 
an impression that they were the experts in this area.32 The IMF had reversed its 
position on the common currency by the end of 1992 and supported the new Kyrgyz 
currency in spring 1993, but the reversal of position was difficult to reconcile with the 
technical advice of the previous year—especially as there was never any admission of 
                                                 
30 Apart from their paying relatively little attention to the region, there has been little political influence 
over the IFIs’ activities in Central Asia. The USA may have encouraged the IFIs’ rapprochement with 
Uzbekistan in 1998-99, but this was nothing like the degree to which the IFIs became explicit tools of 
western, especially US, foreign policy in Mexico in 1994 or in Russia throughout the decade.  
31 Both the IMF and the World Bank were going through a learning phase in 1990-92. From having few 
staff familiar with the transition from central planning and almost none with knowledge of Central 
Asia, they soon had some. 
32 Although the IMF sent occasional missions from Washington, day-to-day technical assistance was 
being provided through resident representatives and consultants. The unified position may have been 
related to a desire to monitor these IMF employees, many of whom were new or temporary, but it also 
appears to have been driven by a paternalistic desire not to confuse local policymakers. The IMF’s 
influence was especially strong in Central Asia because there were few opportunities for national 
policymaker to obtain well-informed second opinions, and few people within national administrations 
with a good understanding of how market-based economies functioned at the macroeconomic level. 
The IMF and World Bank provided training programmes, especially at the Joint Vienna Center, which 
were important in creating a group of mid-level officials with economic knowledge, but senior 
politicians and officials could not take time off running their country in order to study economics and 
had to learn on the job. 16 
error or explanation of why the position had changed. For many people in Central Asia, 
the policy reversal only served to confirm prejudices about the arbitrariness of policy 
conclusions based on western economics. 
The faulty advice on the ruble zone, given with apparent certainty for most of 1992, 
damaged the IMF’s credibility as a technical adviser in macroeconomic matters, with 
lasting consequences in Central Asia—and by extension the episode jaundiced views in 
the region about the technical competence of outside advisers. The most unfortunate 
consequence was Uzbekistan’s imposition of tight exchange controls in the second half 
of 1996 which all western economists would have criticized. Uzbekistan’s policymakers 
paid no attention to IMF advice, even though it was much more firmly based than the 
more debatable 1992 analysis of the ruble zone, and felt vindicated when Malaysia, seen 
by many in Central Asia as the model of successful economic development in an 
Islamic country, introduced capital controls after the 1997 Asian crisis. The fact that the 
Malaysian controls were much lighter and fairly quickly eased was ignored, and 
Uzbekistan was condemned to learn the costs of draconian exchange controls by 
experience over the next half-decade. This episode was important for regional economic 
cooperation, because the absence of a convertible currency in Uzbekistan, the country at 
the geographical heart of Central Asia, has been a fundamental obstacle to regional 
trade and transit. More generally, all multilateral agencies found that the process of 
convincing policymakers of the gains from trade was undermined by suspicion that the 
advice was driven by considerations other than technical analysis.  
4  Multilateral aid for national governments 
The IMF and World Bank were associated with a particular position on the transition 
from central planning. The Washington consensus of the early and mid-1990s was not 
shared equally by all staff, but it remained the company line until a new position was 
adopted in the later 1990s (articulated most forcefully by the World Bank’s new chief 
economist in, for example, Stiglitz 1998). Although the choice of a transition and 
development strategy was an important issue, the desire to maintain a common front 
was less harmful than on the currency issue. First, other multilateral institutions could 
offer alternative perspectives and domestic policymakers felt better placed to judge the 
arguments than on the monetary issue.33 Second, despite heated debates over shock 
therapy versus gradualism in the early transition period, these fizzled out by the end of 
the 1990s. The appropriate speed of reform could be debated, but there was substantial 
agreement about content (price liberalization and macroeconomic stabilization are 
critical elements of transition and the other parts of the consensus were sensible 
components of a development strategy), and the speed issue was passé by the end of the 
century.  
                                                 
33 The UNDP distanced itself from the Washington consensus, often advocating a more gradual approach 
to the transition from central planning and focussing on social sectors rather than macropolicy. There 
has, however, been convergence since the World Bank and IMF in 1999 introduced a new approach to 
their relations with low-income countries, centred on preparation of poverty reduction strategies by 
national governments, and after the ADB made poverty alleviation an overarching policy for all loan 
proposals. 17 
The Kyrgyz Republic quickly became established as the model country in Central Asia 
and, starting with the May 1993 assistance for the establishment of the new national 
currency, it was the leading recipient of multilateral aid.34 In 1992 Kazakhstan rather 
than the Kyrgyz Republic was the reforming leader in Central Asia (Pomfret 1995:  
53-7), but the initial reforming impetus became dissipated in struggles over natural 
resource rents and the spread of corruption, so that outside observers increasingly 
worried about a crisis of governance.35 Meanwhile, the resource-poor Kyrgyz Republic 
had little room for manoeuvre. The dissolution of the USSR and early stages of 
transition had been highly disruptive to the Kyrgyz economy; average incomes fell from 
already low levels and inequality increased, leading to the highest poverty rates in all of 
the former USSR and eastern Europe in 1993 (Milanovic 1998). 
Starting in mid-1993 the Kyrgyz Republic embraced the philosophy of the Washington 
Consensus in return for generous financial assistance and technical support. 
Macroeconomic control was established after the introduction of the national currency, 
and annual inflation was brought below 50 per cent in 1995 (compared to 1996 in 
Kazakhstan, and 1997 or later elsewhere in Central Asia). Financial reform was pursued 
energetically as banks were restructured (with support from an IDA Financial Sector 
Adjustment Credit) and credible prudential regulation enforced after 1995. Privatization 
of housing and small enterprises was completed quickly. Agricultural reform was more 
thorough than in neighbouring countries, although the impact varied significantly from 
region to region. Trade policy was liberalized, and current account convertibility 
established; in 1998 the Kyrgyz Republic became the first Soviet successor state to 
accede to the World Trade Organization. The Kyrgyz Republic’s progress and status as 
the region’s leading economic reformer was lauded in public documents such as the 
World Bank report (1996), but the country’s economic performance was 
disappointing.36 The drop in real output in the first half of the 1990s was larger than in 
most non-war-torn Soviet successor states and the increase in poverty was traumatic, 
especially in the poor rural areas of the south. 
The Kyrgyz Republic’s success in generating foreign aid is reflected in World Bank 
commitments up to the end of 1996 of US$70 per capita, compared to US$49 in 
Kazakhstan, US$11 in Uzbekistan, US$6 in Turkmenistan and US$1 in Tajikistan. 
During the second half of the decade, annual aid flows to the Kyrgyz Republic averaged 
about US$50-60 per head of population which is high by international standards   
                                                 
34 After the dissolution of the USSR, the IFIs’ focus was on supporting ‘reformist’ elements in the 
ongoing political struggles in Russia and, although the Washington institutions established resident 
representatives in many of the southern republics and provided training services in-country and 
abroad, these transition economies in 1992 were not high priorities.  
35 See Kalyuzhnova (1998) and Olcott (2002)—the latter had circulated widely in draft since at least 
1998—and references in Pomfret (2005). Dissolution of parliament and President Nazarbayev’s 
manipulation of the March 1994 election also cast doubt on Kazakhstan’s democratic credentials. 
36  The Kyrgyz Republic was also lauded as an island of democracy and an open society in a region of 
autocracies and intolerance, but the ‘island of democracy’ image is an oversimplified perspective. 
President Akayev ruled by decree when he considered it necessary to push through desirable 
legislation (especially in 1994-96), and his western supporters generally turned a blind eye (Kubicek 
1998). He was as unwilling as other Central Asian presidents to allow establishment of a political 
process that could lead to changes in power. Nevertheless, under Akayev the media flourished more in 
the Kyrgyz Republic than elsewhere in Central Asia and the feeling of oppression was less than in 
other countries. 18 
(Table 3). From 1992 to 2000 international aid to the Kyrgyz Republic amounted to 
US$1.7 billion, over half of which came from the major multilateral agencies: the 
World Bank provided 23 per cent, the ADB 15 per cent, IMF 15 per cent, and EBRD 5 
per cent.37  
The financial assistance enabled the government to reduce inflation without balancing 
domestically generated revenue and expenditure. As tax revenue fell during the early 
stages of transition, expenditures were not cut commensurately and the budget deficit 
peaked at 17 per cent of GDP in 1995. The deficit was reduced after 1995, with less 
draconian expenditure cuts than would have been required in the absence of foreign aid. 
The Kyrgyz Republic’s budget required practically no inflationary financing by the 
central bank in 1997 or 1998, due to huge external support rather than balancing the 
domestic books (Pomfret 2004). Success in reducing inflation could then be used as 
evidence that the country had been deserving of support because its economic reform 
strategy and economic policies were sound, although it was really the foreign aid which 
had underpinned the success in reducing inflation. 
Macroeconomic stabilization is an important achievement, but in the Kyrgyz Republic it 
came at a high price in terms of external debt. International aid in the 1990s was 
provided about one-fifth in grants and four-fifths in loans. Even if World Bank, ADB, 
IMF and EBRD loans were provided on better than commercial terms, they still had to 
be serviced and eventually repaid. By mid-1998 external debt exceeded US$1 billion, 
over half of which was on concessional terms from multilateral institutions; the main 
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Aid to Central Asia Countries, various years 











              
Kazakhstan   223    (14)    268  (18)  1,983  0  502  539  1,400 
Kyrgyz  Republic   240   (50)   198   (36)  0  718  57  252  174 
Tajikistan   161   (26)   144   (23)  0  361  2  165  49 
Turkmenistan   24   (5)   27   (6)  90  0  0  0  133 
Uzbekistan   158    (7)   194    (8)  554  85  860  165  599 
Notes:   DAC data are annual aid flows from OECD members and multilateral agencies, as reported by 
donors (numbers in parentheses are dollars per capita).  
  All other data are cumulative totals since the Central Asian countries began borrowing: 
  World Bank data are for cumulative lending up to 30 June 2005; 
  IDA loans are soft loans;  
  ADB data are for cumulative lending up to 31 December 2003;  
  IMF disbursements are in million SDRs, cumulative to 30 April 2006;  
  EBRD data are cumulative totals up to 31 December 2005 of funds committed to financing 
private sector projects, usually as a joint sponsor with a larger contribution from other sources. 
Sources:  Official websites (accessed 22 May 2006). 
                                                 
37  The major bilateral donors were Japan (15 per cent of the total), and Germany, Switzerland and the 
EU (each 4 per cent). 19 
items were US$267 million owed to the World Bank’s concessional arm (the IDA) and 
US$127 million under the IMF’s Extended Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), 
while others included concessional loans from the ADB and the EBRD.38 Until the late 
1990s, the government acted as though the foreign aid could be used to smooth out the 
consumption shock from transition and the dissolution of the USSR, without worrying 
about investing the funds in order to generate the foreign exchange earnings necessary 
to service or repay the loans.39 In 2002, when the debt/GDP ratio was over 100 per cent, 
the Kyrgyz Republic was forced to turn to the Paris Club for rescheduling. 
The Kyrgyz Republic’s debt problem, now the worst in the CIS, arose because both the 
IFIs and the Kyrgyz government underestimated the depth and length of the transitional 
recession, and hence failed to recognize how much consumption smoothing could be 
achieved by loans without creating an unrepayable debt (Helbling, Mody and Sahay 
2003). One problem with this analysis is that in the dire situation of 1992-96, it would 
have been difficult for the government to reduce consumption by any more than actually 
happened (the Kyrgyz Republic had the highest poverty rate of any transition economy 
in 1993; only Tajikistan suffered more in the later 1990s, and that was due to civil war). 
The Washington consensus policy package exacerbated the short-run costs of transition, 
and if the IFIs really wanted the Kyrgyz Republic to adopt this policy package, then it 
should have been supported with an aid package containing more grants and fewer 
loans. As with any delinquent debtor, the Kyrgyz government could be criticized for 
failing to borrow within its means, but blame also lay with the IFIs which lent without 
due diligence in assessing ability to repay or full explanation of the need to repay. 
The other four Central Asian countries have all received less aid per capita than the 
Kyrgyz Republic (Table 3). Kazakhstan received the largest aggregate aid from the IFIs, 
led by a US$700 million commitment in 1994 for support for the national currency. 
Subsequently, the IFIs’ enthusiasm for Kazakhstan waned, perhaps in response to 
concerns about internal political or economic developments or to external political 
conditions.40 Relations remained cordial and technical cooperation continued, but 
financial aid was small, and little needed after the oilboom began.  
Uzbekistan after independence was cold-shouldered by the west as an undemocratic and 
unreforming regime. Relations with the IFIs were formal but not cordial; Uzbekistan did 
not receive the same assistance as the Kyrgyz Republic or Kazakhstan for the 
establishment of its national currency, and relations deteriorated even further in 1996. 
The stand-off was not uncongenial to President Karimov who emphasised his country’s 
                                                 
38 See IMF (1999: 125). The external debt for all Soviet successor states except Russia had been zero at 
the start of 1992 when Russia assumed the USSR’s external assets and liabilities. 
39  In the Soviet era, the Kyrgyz Republic had become used to external assistance in the form of net flows 
from the rest of the USSR, but these paper debts were never repaid. A big difference in the post-1991 
situation was that the assistance led to accumulated debt which was intended to be serviced. 
40  Kazakhstan’s slide into authoritarianism could be seen as a necessary response to the delicate ethnic 
balance but once President Nazarbayev embarked on this path, concern for state stability transformed 
into concern for his own political longevity, and ‘a solid undemocratic foundation’ was laid (Bremmer 
and Welt 1996). At the same time, privatization of large enterprises, especially in the natural resource 
sector, at giveaway prices created a new rich class and an aura of corruption (Pomfret 2005). As 
mentioned earlier, the ethnic situation and strong economic links kept Kazakhstan closely aligned to 
Russia. 20 
independence and outperforming the good pupils. The IFIs were somewhat embarrassed 
by Uzbekistan’s economic success, with the smallest 1989-96 decline in real output of 
any Soviet successor state. Whether the performance was due to favourable initial 
conditions or good policies remains contentious, but Uzbekistan was helped by buoyant 
cotton prices in the early and mid-1990s.41 Reversal of these price trends in 1996 set in 
motion the reimposition of exchange controls in the second half of the year, despite 
commitments to the contrary to the IMF, and the rupture of relations between 
Uzbekistan and the IFIs.42 In the late 1990s both sides sought a rapprochement, as the 
increasingly obvious costs of the exchange controls stimulated rethinking of 
Uzbekistan’s gradual reform strategy, at the same time as rethinking of the Washington 
consensus made the IFIs more amenable to a heterodox strategy. The warmth was 
increased as Uzbekistan assumed a pivotal role in the fight against terrorism during the 
Afghanistan invasion, but it cooled even more rapidly as the regime’s brutality received 
wider coverage, and especially after the deaths of demonstrators in Andijan in May 
2005. 
Turkmenistan’s gradualism has been a synonym for non-reform, and its relations with 
the IFIs have been minimal. The government has been autocratic, with an extreme 
personality cult. Without exception the international agencies and western governments 
have held back from close contact with Turkmenistan.43 
In Tajikistan the intermittent civil war was not resolved until the June 1997 peace 
agreement. During the war the central government was heavily dependent on Russia—
and to a lesser extent Uzbekistan—for military and other financial support, and by   
1996 had the highest debt/GDP ratio in the CIS, 84 per cent (Kapur and van der 
Mensbrugghe 1997: 24). Serious economic reforms were pursued in a sustained manner 
only after 1997; before that, relations with the IFIs were limited.44 Although some signs 
are emerging of economic liberalism on the Kyrgyz model, driven by similar resource 
scarcity and widespread poverty, there is a gap between declared policies and 
implementation. Given the extent of poverty, Tajikistan’s need for assistance is the 
highest in the region, but aid disbursements are limited by concerns about domestic 
absorption capacity and corruption. 
                                                 
41 Some of the good performance may reflect optimistic data, but Taube and Zettelmeyer (1998) 
conclude that only a small part of Uzbekistan’s performance can be explained away as a statistical 
artefact. 
42 Uzbekistan’s disbursements from the IMF (Table 3) amounted to 106 million SDRs in 1995 and 59 
million in 1996, but nothing since then. Initially the frostiness was on the side of the IMF, but after the 
magnitude of the Kyrgyz Republic’s debt burden to the IFIs became apparent, Uzbekistan appeared to 
have no desire to borrow even when relations with the IMF warmed in the early 2000s.  
43 The World Bank committed US$25 million in 1995 and US$64 million in 1997, but only US$5 
million had been disbursed by the end of 1997. A similar pattern of small disbursements applies to 
EBRD loans. The IMF has limited itself to technical assistance. Turkmenistan did not join the ADB 
until 2001, perhaps seeing the Asian agency as a counter-weight to the Washington–based institutions 
which were providing negative publicity about the country’s economic policies. 
44 The first financial assistance from the IMF and World Bank was in 1996, but after the resumption of 
violence in December 1996 and kidnapping of UN and Red Cross personnel in early 1997, the IMF 
and World Bank resident representatives were evacuated in February (they returned in May). IMF 
staff were involved in developing the new economic reform programme after October 1997. The main 
source of western assistance to Tajikistan until then was humanitarian aid mainly from the USA, the 
EU and its member states, and UN agencies (UNDP 1997: 103-4). 21 
Despite differences in institutional philosophy and incentives to distinguish their 
programme, aid to Central Asia from the multilateral agencies has followed a common 
pattern of favouring the Kyrgyz Republic, preferring Kazakhstan over Uzbekistan, and 
ignoring Turkmenistan. Whether this is driven by need or economic strategy or political 
liberalism is difficult to determine, because all point to the same ranking of aid 
recipients. Ideology might explain the relative generosity of aid to the Kyrgyz Republic, 
but it is simply a more congenial counterpart than authoritarian Uzbekistan, pathological 
Turkmenistan or dysfunctional Tajikistan.45 
The general record and reputation of the international agencies have probably improved 
as the national governments have learned, to varying degrees, to work with them. The 
mixed performance of the Kyrgyz Republic has not obviously strengthened the 
credibility of the IFIs’ advice; by accepting the whole Washington consensus package, 
the Kyrgyz Republic has entered the ranks of the highly indebted poor countries. 
Nevertheless, many micro projects supported by technical assistance and loans from the 
IFIs have been beneficial. The outcome has been that governments have learned to be 
more wary of taking on loans and discriminating in their relations with the IFIs.46 
The major multilateral economic institutions have pursued similar country priorities in 
Central Asia, but there has been some institutional differentiation by functional area. 
The IMF remains the principal provider of advice and assistance on macroeconomic 
problems, but the demand for such advice and assistance has diminished. The World 
Bank has been lead advisor on structural adjustment, public finances and financial 
sector reform.47 The ADB was rather slow to become involved in Central Asia but, 
together with ESCAP, it has focussed on transport and other infrastructure projects. The 
EBRD is distinguished by its orientation towards the private sector, and much of its 
lending has gone to promote small and medium enterprises in the region, but it still has 
to deal with national governments and it made a disastrous decision when it held its 
2003 annual meetings in Uzbekistan.48 Although the common country priorities and the 
                                                 
45 Praise of democratic tendencies followed identification of the Kyrgyz Republic as a model of 
economic reform in Central Asia rather than being the reason for aid, and in the mid-1990s President 
Akayev governed autocratically without loss of his preferred status among western leaders. Elsewhere 
in the region, the IFIs’ aid has shown little relation to the degree of democracy, with no assistance 
going to relatively democratic Azerbaijan in 1992 and 1993. The limited aid to Uzbekistan and to 
Turkmenistan is explained by these countries’ failure to embrace the Washington consensus economic 
policies as well as by their undemocratic regimes. Increased aid to Azerbaijan from 1995 onwards 
followed unilateral adoption of economic stabilization by an undemocratic regime; neither the policies 
nor the nature of the regime were much affected by the provision of western aid. 
46 The generalization is also complicated by the concessional component of aid, e.g., for Uzbekistan 
almost all IFI assistance has been on non-concessional terms (Lane 2003: 17) which presumably 
reinforces awareness of the repayment issues. There is also greater comprehension that the IFIs are not 
simply pawns of the western powers and that they may have their own motives, including pressures on 
desk officers to make loans. 
47 Since the introduction of the poverty reduction and strategy paper (PRSP) process in 1999 the IMF and 
World Bank have explicitly aimed to coordinate their advice and assistance in conjunction with 
national stakeholders. There are, however, concerns over ‘mission creep’, and some commentators 
(e.g., the Meltzer Commission in the USA) have criticized the IMF’s involvement in poverty 
reduction. 
48 Holding the 2003 meetings in Tashkent was intended as a signal of EBRD’s increased attention to 
Central Asia as its eastern European and Baltic clients were about to join the European Union, but the 
EBRD set targets on human rights issues such as the elimination of torture which the Uzbekistan 22 
agreed functional differentiation sound as though they would provide a solid basis for 
promoting regional cooperation where that is needed in Central Asia, the record on 
regional cooperation has been disappointing. The next section analyses why the 
multilateral agencies (and bilateral aid donors) have been so ineffective in promoting 
regional cooperation even when the benefits appear to be obvious and large 
5 Regional  cooperation and multilateral aid 
There are several reasons for regional cooperation in Central Asia.49 External assistance 
can help to realize the benefits from regional cooperation by creating supernational 
institutions, fostering trust, and providing expertise and finance. Where agreement is 
needed on sharing regional public goods such as water resources, an external ‘honest 
broker’ can help to establish the higher authority which will settle disputes over the 
distribution of costs and benefits or facilitate renegotiation of arrangements as 
circumstances change.  
Water resource management (including the desiccation of the Aral Sea and related 
energy supply issues) is the most critical area for regional cooperation in Central Asia, 
but also one of the least tractable. The failure to take any common action on the 
desiccation of the Aral Sea is symptomatic of the inability of Central Asia’s leaders to 
cooperate on a pressing regional issue, and the record of aid to deal with the Aral Sea 
disaster is poor. Security matters have been dominant since 1999, and have entered the 
international spotlight since September 2001 but they are not likely to provide an arena 
for cooperation among aid donors.50 Trade facilitation, while more mundane, is an area 
in which stepwise progress could be made to reduce foregone opportunities for mutually 
beneficial trade due to impediments such as unnecessary delays or bureaucracy at 
border crossings or in transit, and official or unofficial taxes on traders. 
 5.1 The Aral Sea 
The Aral Sea poses an environmentally serious but also intractable problem because the 
states involved can only see short-term economic costs from addressing   
the environmental disaster. The problem is straightforward. Ever increasing demands on 
the water of the two river systems, the Amudarya and Syrdarya rivers, have so far 
reduced the amount of water reaching the Aral Sea, the world’s fourth-biggest lake 
(after the Caspian, Lake Superior and Lake Victoria) as recently as 1960. Between 1960 
and 2000, the Aral Sea’s area fell by half, its volume by 80 per cent and the shoreline 
receded by 60-80 km as it subdivided into two small lakes. The fisheries and other sea-
based activities were destroyed by the end of the 1980s. The shrinking of the Aral Sea 
has changed climate patterns, increasing extremes of heat and cold, shrinking growing 
seasons and reducing crop yields. Exposure of the seabed has been accompanied by dust 
                                                                                                                                               
government was not prepared to meet; EBRD involvement in Uzbekistan was substantially reduced in 
2004, and the only multilateral institution left with an active programme in Uzbekistan was the ADB. 
49 UNDP (2005) provides a general assessment of regional cooperation in Central Asia. 
50 Some indirect assistance may be given by programmes run by the UN, for example, to improve border 
management and restrict the trade in narcotics. 23 
storms carrying toxic chemicals (a legacy of the fertilizer-intensive nature of Soviet 
cotton-farming) for thousands of kilometres. Morbidity rates have risen in the affected 
areas, especially in Karakalpakstan and Dashkoguz, where high levels of anaemia 
contribute to underweight babies and high infant mortality rates; respiratory diseases, 
dysentery, hepatitis, typhoid and tuberculosis, associated with poor water supply and 
sanitation, are also prevalent.51 
The solution is straightforward in principle: reduce the quantity of water being taken out 
of the river systems. Before 1992 water was allocated by the central authorities in 
Moscow using formula-driven methods which the Central Asian republics had little 
power to dispute, but which clearly needed to be revised in order to reverse the 
desiccation of the Aral Sea. After independence, the Central Asian leadership looked for 
technical fixes, and Weinthal (2002: 195) argues that it was the (mistaken) prospect of 
funding for such schemes that led them to welcome international financial institutions’ 
involvement in the Aral Sea after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In fact, no 
institution was prepared to provide anything like the amount of funds needed to finance 
the grand technical schemes.52 When instead all they could offer was advice to reduce 
water-usage, this fell on deaf ears and attempts to foster regional cooperation were 
doomed to failure. 
The World Bank, which played the lead role in negotiations in the mid-1990s, tried to 
streamline the post-Soviet institutional arrangements and to focus narrowly on water. In 
1993 the five Central Asian countries established the Interstate Fund for Saving the Aral 
Sea (IFAS), and under the IFAS, the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination 
(ICWC), with a secretariat in Khujand, Tajikistan, is the implementing body responsible 
for managing the seasonal allocation of water. Lack of funds from the national 
governments limited the effectiveness of these bodies, and in 1994 the IFAS and 
external donors came together in the Aral Sea Basin Programme, administered through 
a special office of the World Bank with US$60 million funding.53 More fundamental to 
the ineffectiveness of the IFAS, however, was the rotating chairmanship and its lack of 
authority. The technical management institutions for the two river systems are both 
headquartered in Uzbekistan and mainly staffed by Uzbek nationals, which inhibits 
other countries’ confidence in their activities even though they report to the ICWC. 
Actual control over water flows is dependent on the agreement of national entities such 
as power companies, e.g., the headgates of the Toktogul Reservoir are under the control 
                                                 
51 The most directly affected regions—the autonomous republic of Karakalpakstan and Khorezm in 
northwest Uzbekistan, Kyzylorda and South Kazakhstan, and Dashkoguz in northern Turkmenistan—
are among the poorest areas of the respective countries. The full extent of the health problem is 
difficult to assess because few outsiders travel to Karakalpakstan and Dashkoguz, and the authorities 
conceal much of what happens there. In Kazakhstan, where the authorities are more open, mutations 
are reported.  
52 A Soviet-era scheme to divert waters from the River Ob in Siberia to Central Asia is sometimes 
revived, usually by Russian politicians considering the geopolitical benefits of increasing Central 
Asian dependence on Russia. Yuri Luzhkov, mayor of Moscow and an influential Russian politician, 
for example, has campaigned for the Ob-diversion project, arguing that Russia has plenty of water to 
sell and the US$34 billion project is necessary to forestall a huge wave of Central Asian immigrants 
pushed into Russia by water-related economic failure in Central Asia. 
53 UNEP, which had been involved in a technical capacity since 1989, was also engaged in promoting 
regional cooperation on the Aral Sea, but due to its limited financial resources, it was perceived as 
secondary to the World Bank during 1992-97. 24 
of the Kyrgyz Ministry of Energy over whom the ICWC had no authority (Weinthal 
2002: 1845). In 1997 the World Bank closed its office due to lack of effective progress 
in coordinating actions with respect to the Aral Sea. 
The World Bank’s narrow focus on water failed, but other approaches fared no better, 
e.g., the attempts by USAid to create new structures linking water and energy issues 
were naïve considering the entrenched power of the existing bureaucracies. For 
international organizations and foreign economists, the least confrontational solution 
would be to use the price mechanism to allocate a reduced amount of water to 
competing demands. However, apart from the Kyrgyz Republic, which adopted 
legislation in July 2001 making water a tradable commodity, and some quarters in 
Kazakhstan, most Central Asian policymaking elites have a deep antipathy to the 
concept for cultural reasons associated with the role of water in this arid region, and also 
because of concerns about fairness and opportunities for corruption, technical 
monitoring problems, and the inability of the poorest farmers to afford any but 
negligibly low prices for irrigation water. Despite the downstream countries’ 
reservations about using prices in international trade in water, where they are importers 
and hence satisfied with a zero price, water pricing is likely to come eventually to 
the downstream countries because it is the most efficient way to allocate water 
domestically—but it will not be forced on them by external agencies.54 
A major component of any solution to the Aral Sea problem should be to increase the 
efficiency with which water is used in Central Asia, where profligate practices were 
encouraged in the Soviet era, but national governments refuse to accept externally 
imposed agrarian reform. In the absence of improved water-use efficiency, however, 
reduction in the amount of water available for irrigation will make any agriculture 
denied of water infeasible in the arid conditions of Central Asia. This would be 
especially disastrous for Turkmenistan, most of whose agriculture draws on water 
carried by the Karakum Canal, a 1,300 km open channel westwards from the Amudarya 
River which has been the single main contributor to the shrinking of the Aral Sea.55 
Apart from unequal sharing of costs and benefits across countries, there would also be 
intra-country conflicts of interest. Much of the irrigated area of Tajikistan is marginal 
agricultural land with poor farmers who would be hard hit by reduced availability of 
water, while in Uzbekistan the areas where irrigated agriculture should be discontinued 
rather than reformed are concentrated in Kashkadarya province (World Bank 2002b: 
vii). In international negotiations on how to deal with the Aral Sea crisis, agricultural 
change has been kept off the agenda. 
Given the huge obstacles to negotiating an international solution, existing intrastate 
agreements, administered by the ICWC, have essentially maintained the pre-1992 status 
                                                 
54 Water is implicitly priced in the energy-for-water barter agreements because there is no exogenously 
determined price for the energy component of the swaps. 
55 President Niyazov seemed, if anything, intent on enhancing the irrigated agricultural area in 
Turkmenistan, and some observers have speculated that if Turkmenistan proceeds with plans to build 
a huge artificial lake in the country’s desert, it could trigger war with Uzbekistan. Water conflicts 
between Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan already existed as a result of Turkmenistan’s construction of a 
canal to (inefficiently) bypass Uzbekistan and secure its own water, and accusations by Uzbekistan 
that Turkmenistan has been failing to maintain the pumping stations at Karshi and Amu-Bukhara 
which serve Uzbekistan or to clean drains through which water passes from Turkmenistan to 
Uzbekistan. 25 
quo under which Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are allocated over 70 per 
cent of the water in the Amudarya and Syrdarya river systems, while the upstream 
countries—the Kyrgyz Republic (source of 25 per cent of the water) and Tajikistan 
(source of 55 per cent)—are allocated 0.4 per cent and 11 per cent, respectively; 16 per 
cent is allocated to the Aral Sea and a small proportion to northern Afghanistan. The 
upstream countries agree to release water for the irrigation needs of the downstream 
countries in return for guaranteed deliveries of other energy sources in winter although 
these agreements are regularly breached and the specific terms, which are largely barter 
arrangements, have been frequently revised. Despite their flaws these agreements have 
been critical in preventing interstate armed conflict over water resources, and 
international nongovernmental organizations or multilateral agencies (such as the World 
Bank or UNEP) have been facilitators of agreement, often providing or identifying side-
payments which lubricate a deal (Weinthal 2002). 
The conflicts are becoming more severe over time because the annual releases from the 
reservoirs exceed the average inflow, a situation which was exacerbated by dry 
conditions in 2000 and 2001. Prior to 1991, annual releases from the Toktogul reservoir 
on the Syrdarya River system averaged 2.7 km
3 in winter and 8.0 km
3 in summer which 
was below the long-term average inflow of 12.3 km
3, but between 1995 and 2000 the 
annual release was 13.5 km
3 (Biddison 2002: 4). The Kyrgyz agreements with 
Kazakhstan have been reasonably stable, with Kazakhstan supplying coal and oil for 
water, but agreements with Uzbekistan have been more volatile, leading the Kyrgyz and 
Tajik governments to threaten (or actually) to produce more hydropower in winter and 
hence have less water available for release during the cotton-growing season. So far 
there have been fewer disputes over Amudarya water, because the sole major upstream 
power station on the Nurek reservoir in Tajikistan has operated below capacity and also 
because Afghanistan has not fully used its water entitlement. In the future, economic 
stability and growth in Afghanistan could lead in short order to increased use for 
irrigation because the left-bank of the Amudarya is suited to gravity irrigation without 
the need for investment in pumping facilities. 
In sum, efforts to resolve the Aral Sea problem have been ineffective beyond the short-
term achievement of avoiding water wars, and the situation will get worse. The 
fundamental problem is that all parties, but especially the downstream (and more 
conservative) countries—Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan—are defensive about their 
perceived national interests, unwilling to countenance the necessary domestic changes 
in agriculture, and suspicious of any change in the current interstate arrangements 
(Horsman 2001). All attempts at multilateral solutions have been doomed due to a lack 
of political will on the part of the national governments to accept the costs needed to 
realize the obvious (global) benefits. 
5.2 Trade  facilitation 
Regional cooperation on trade facilitation is a more promising area than the Aral Sea for 
multilateral assistance because the national interests in resisting change are less strong 
and win-win situations amenable to piecemeal improvement are more easily 
identifiable. The dissolution of the Soviet Union was associated with economic 
disintegration as old coordination mechanisms disappeared and new national borders 
appeared. Since 1991, the Central Asian countries’ generally disappointing trade 26 
performance, with only energy exports flourishing, has contributed to a poor economic 
performance with substantial increases in inequality and poverty. 
External advice has been important in making the intellectual case for openness and, 
more influentially, providing the empirical evidence for the relationship between trade 
and growth. Trade policies (tariffs, quotas and related non-tariff barriers) have not been 
major barriers to intra-Central Asian trade although the unpredictability of such 
measures (e.g., temporary duties or other restrictions on trade) has been a problem on 
occasion. Both trade within the region and external trade are constrained by poor 
infrastructure. Improving the hard infrastructure of the transport and communications 
systems (roads, bridges, ports, etc.) is primarily a matter for national action and, 
although there are benefits from regional cooperation, they will not be addressed in this 
paper.56 Especially important has been lack of cooperation on soft infrastructure which 
would facilitate cross-border and transit trade for these landlocked countries (ADB 
2006).  
Trade facilitation and soft infrastructure are impediments to trade not included under 
trade policy or the hard infrastructure. Customs policies and practices are a major 
problem because, apart from uncoordinated opening times and other physical problems, 
the customs services still have a philosophy of control rather than facilitation. All 
countries in the region undertake inspection of all vehicles at which the trader or 
trader’s representative must be physically present, increasing border dwell times and 
providing opportunities for abuse as officials on the spot enjoy discretion in interpreting 
complicated rules and schedules. Other examples of poor soft infrastructure include 
internal breakdowns of law and order which undermine the security of traders, arbitrary 
levies on traders, changes in trade or trade-related regulations, taxation systems which 
discriminate against traders by being imposed on traded goods both as exports and as 
imports, rudimentary communications networks which make it difficult to obtain 
information about current conditions in the foreign market and en route, and poorly 
developed banking and insurance services which are exacerbated in some countries by 
poor payment mechanisms due to inconvertibility or lack of confidence in national 
currencies. Predictability in areas such as customs duties, fees and so forth is itself a 
positive factor in facilitating trade, but one feature of Central Asia’s post-independence 
economic history has been volatility.57 
                                                 
56 The inherited networks of the former Soviet republics emphasized links to Russia at the expense of 
links to the east or south. Since independence, national infrastructure spending has often focussed on 
improving internal communications within each new state, rather than strengthening the regional 
network or coordinating access to southern or eastern neighbours. 
57 Uzbekistan suddenly re-introduced tight foreign exchange controls in response to a balance of 
payments problem triggered by falling cotton prices. Similarly draconian controls were imposed by 
Turkmenistan in December 1998. After the August 1998 Russian crisis which hit Kazakhstan hardest 
among the Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan imposed special tariffs as high as 200 per cent on a 
number of goods imported from the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan and in April 1999 the Kazakh 
tenge was floated which led to an effective 50 per cent devaluation. Border enforcement has at times 
been lax and at other times rigorous, with occasional total closure, e.g., for several months in 1999 
Uzbekistan unilaterally closed all but one of the posts along its border with Kazakhstan. Such actions 
are often unpredictable and may be only discovered upon arrival at the border. In July 2000 
Kazakhstan increased the bond required from customs agents from US$5,000 to US$20,000, a 
measure justified by government officials in terms of concerns about the financial stability of smaller 27 
The trade situation in Central Asia in the 1990s represented a tragedy of the anti-
commons, where excessive ability of official and unofficial regulators to tap the gains 
from trade forestalled potential win-win situations.58 A practical example (and just one 
of thousands) occurred in 1999 when the high shipment costs across Kazakhstan made 
Kyrgyz vegetable exports to Russia unprofitable. When Kyrgyz onions were not 
exported, Russian consumers missed their onions, Kyrgyz producers swamped the 
domestic market driving down prices, and Kazakhstan received no transit charges. Thus 
both Kazakhstan and Russia were absolute losers. The only gainers were Kyrgyz 
consumers but even for the Kyrgyz Republic, the net loss was undoubtedly substantial, 
because the Kyrgyz-Russian onion trade was so clearly a case of efficient specialization 
and the onions could be more valuable earning foreign currency to pay for imports than 
adding to the amount of domestically consumed onions. Because the numerous 
individual fee-leviers across Kazakhstan each tried to maximize their own ‘tax’ on the 
transit trade, the trade was choked off, to almost everybody’s disadvantage. Moreover if 
the trade is cut off for some time, it will not be a simple matter to restart it because 
connections will have been lost and new channels to Russian wholesalers will have to 
be established. 
Why do these lose-lose situations arise? Each individual with the power to levy a fee 
along the road from the farm in the Kyrgyz Republic to the onion market in Russia 
thinks only of maximizing their own returns. Given that the trader has started out on the 
enterprise, he or she will be willing to pay the extra cost as long as the shipment retains 
value, but at some stage the trader will look at the total costs and decide it is not worth 
trying to make a new shipment. There is a coordination problem because each levier of 
fees will not consider this possible effect of their combined actions. Such impediments 
to trade tend to be very specific and often individually minor, but it is important to see 
the big picture of their overall effect. If impediments to trade are sufficiently large, trade 
will be choked off with no prospect of realizing the potential gains from trade.  
How large are the social costs of impediments to trade within the region? Without trade, 
it is not always clear how much has been lost because the alternative with-trade 
situation is not observed. Measurement of something that does not happen is always 
difficult, and even rough estimates are hard to make when we have little idea of 
potential areas of comparative advantage or of the relevant demand and supply curves. 
The burdens of trade impediments are likely to be heaviest in markets where supply is 
elastic. If demand is also elastic, then relatively small impediments will cut trade 
volumes far below potential. This is likely to best describe household or labour-
intensive activities, like the Kyrgyz onion farmers, underlining the regressive impact of 
trade impediments which are likely to hit the poor hardest. Beyond basic necessities, the 
demand for non-luxury consumption goods is likely to be more price elastic so that the 
                                                                                                                                               
brokerage firms and expected to reduce the number of customs agents from 75 to 15, but exporters to 
Kazakhstan were concerned about the anti-competitive impact of the reduced number of agents. 
58 The tragedy of the commons arises from too many people having access to a common resource, such 
as fisheries; each fisher has an incentive to catch as much as possible because any individual 
conservation strategy will be ineffective as fish left in the water will be caught by other fishers. The 
tragedy of the anti-commons arises when too many people have the potential to hold-up an activity by 
levying taxes or imposing other costs. As in the tragedy of the commons, each hold-up agent will 
ignore potential externalities of their actions and try to maximize current benefits, in this case leading 
to too little rather than too much of the activity actually taking place. 28 
non-rich members of the community will be hit as consumers. A useful role for external 
agencies is to provide estimates of the net benefits from removing trade impediments 
and to publicize who bears the costs, and perhaps assist financially with the adjustment 
costs.59 
The internal levies are an example of the cost to traders from the failure to establish the 
authority of the central government or even from a breakdown of law and order. The 
solution in more established areas of flourishing intra-regional trade is for the 
government to exert its influence to prevent a tragedy of the anti-commons. In the new 
states of Central Asia, it is necessary to convince governments that they should play this 
role. Enforceability of contracts is critical to the smooth operation of a market economy, 
and so is protection from arbitrary intrusion into property rights; in Central Asia these 
are inadequately addressed by the national governments although with the ongoing 
process of nation-building, things may be improving.60 Since the early 1990s, contracts 
have been especially difficult to enforce when the dispute is between people in different 
jurisdictions, and an obstacle to international cooperation to promote the enforceability 
of contracts is the mutual mistrust between the political entities.61 
Transit is an area where regional cooperation is clearly desirable, especially given the 
landlocked status of the Central Asian countries and their long pre-independence history 
of free transit within the region. Since 1991 transit rights have varied, and it is difficult 
even to establish transit rates which are often levied irregularly by local police. An often 
cited figure from the late 1990s is of lorries travelling through Kazakhstan from the 
Kyrgyz Republic to Russia paying on average ten such levies, amounting to an average 
of US$1,700. Uzbekistan’s complaints about transit charges in Kazakhstan include 
unofficial and local levies, as well as national measures.62 When tensions between the 
                                                 
59 Schiff and Winters (2002: 10-11) include this in their list of ways in which international organizations 
can promote regional cooperation. They also emphasize the potential for international organizations to 
act as honest brokers in determining a fair allocation of costs and benefits and they provide several 
interesting case studies, although surprisingly they claim the Aral Sea as an example of successful 
regional cooperation fostered by the World Bank and UNEP. 
60 The beneficiaries from internal levies and other sources of corruption may be protected by the 
government. Allocation of remunerative jobs in the customs service is a way for politicians to keep 
their clients happy and in some cases the point of complex regulations seems to be to increase the 
potential unofficial earnings of such clients. The solution is to convince the central government that it 
is better served by an efficient public service in which employees will need to be paid attractive 
salaries. 
61 When fees are levied or regulations imposed in differing countries, there is a tendency to see the 
benefits as accruing to the country levying the fees and the costs being born by foreigners, especially 
with transit trade where there is no impact on domestic consumers. The problem is complicated 
because there are genuine reasons to charge fees for road and rail use or to regulate axle size of lorries 
and so forth but if the sum of the fees or the heterogeneity of the rules chokes off trade, then nobody 
benefits. 
62 Kazakhstan’s regulations impose additional fees if the truck’s weight or size exceeds certain limits 
and if the truck deviates from its previously specified route The maximum weight of trucks allowed to 
enter Kazakhstan is 36 tons which is less than international standards (normally between 38 and 54 
tons) and Uzbekistan’s 40 ton limit. Lack of agreement on the limit makes it likely that an Uzbek 
truck entering Kazakhstan will have to pay US$100-150 for exceeding the Kazakhstani limit. 
Agreements on the use of refrigerated railcars also broke down and were not renewed in 1999, leading 
Uzbekistan to find alternative routes for shipping perishable goods. Any railcars passing through 
Kazakhstan are subject to a US$14 per railcar fee which Uzbekistan claims is contrary to agreements. 29 
two countries have risen, the Kazakh authorities have closed part of the Tashkent-
Samarkand main road which passes through Kazakhstan territory, imposing a long 
detour along minor roads for travellers between the two largest cities of Uzbekistan. 
Using these practices as justification, Uzbekistan has introduced its own restrictive 
measures which is especially important, given the crossroads location of Uzbekistan. 
Turkmenistan—which has the only railway south from Central Asia and the main port 
on the east coast of the Caspian Sea—could be a significant route for other Central 
Asian countries’ international trade but levies high transit fees. This hard line, although 
short-sighted, is not surprising given the extent to which Turkmenistan has suffered 
from transit fees charged by Russia on gas exports to Ukraine and the Caucasus. 
Nevertheless, it is a stark example of the tragedy of the anti-commons by which the 
imposition of a series of high transit charges along roads crossing several countries 
chokes off the trade so that nobody benefits.63 
Many regional organizations have included transit among their terms of reference but 
the situation has deteriorated rather than improved since the dissolution of the USSR. 
The main economic goal of the CIS was to maintain as many elements as possible of the 
Soviet economic space, including secure rights of transit, and many of the regional trade 
agreements among subgroups of CIS members have included transit clauses. Central 
Asian reginal trading agreements (RTAs) such as the Central Asian Economic 
Community and its successor the Central Asian Cooperation Organization included 
clauses on transit rights, but members continually complained about contravention of 
the agreement by other members. The Russian-led Eurasian Economic Community—of 
which Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan have been members since the 
1990s and Uzbekistan joined in 2005—has also promoted freer transit. The Economic 
Cooperation Organization—to which all five Central Asian countries acceded in 1992 
and whose members also include Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey—
has negotiated two transit agreements but neither has been ratified by all national 
parliaments and the agreements are essentially dead. The fundamental problem with 
these regional trade agreements has been a lack of national commitment and a tendency 
to view them in political terms which has often widened regional fissures rather than 
promoting cooperation. 
The involvement of international agencies in promoting regional cooperation on trade 
facilitation and, specifically, trying to facilitate improved transit arrangements in 
Central Asia began from the date of independence but has a limited record of 
achievement. TRACECA, launched in 1993 with the support of the EU, aimed to create 
a transit corridor linking Central Asia to Europe through the Caucasus, focusing on hard 
infrastructure and trade facilitation (e.g., harmonizing border crossing procedures and 
implementing a unified policy on transit fees) with funding available for technical 
assistance in modernizing customs services. Such grand schemes, often phrased in terms 
of creating a new Silk Road, may have helped long-distance traders but do not address 
the more pervasive local problems. 
                                                 
63 This is most obviously apparent for Uzbekistan which is double-landlocked and hence any exports 
must cross at least two other countries in order to reach an ocean port, but in practice it also applies to 
much of the trade of the other Central Asian countries due to the nature of the inherited transport 
system. 30 
Various external ad hoc organizations supported by multilateral aid agencies (e.g., 
SPECA, supported by ESCAP and ECE, or CAREC, supported by the ADB and IMF) 
have devoted resources to promoting regional cooperation in trade but with very limited 
practical outcomes. One problem has been to define the geographical coverage, e.g., 
SPECA includes only the five Central Asian countries, while CAREC does not include 
Turkmenistan but does include Azerbaijan, Mongolia and Xinjiang autonomous region 
of China. Such groupings have fallen foul of the kind of geopolitics described above; 
regional organizations such as ECO or the CIS or Eurasian Economic Community are 
jealous of the jurisdictional overlaps, even though improved transit arrangements in any 
part of Central Asia would be desirable. In the late 1990s, for example, SPECA became 
associated with the pro-Russian countries at a time when Uzbekistan was in the opposite 
camp.64 The current prospects for CAREC may be more positive because its 
membership overlaps that of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization which is currently 
in favour with all of the Central Asian countries except Turkmenistan, but that could 
change if any country decides to distance itself from Russian or Chinese influence. 
A more practical approach to trade facilitation may be to focus on specific transport 
corridors and provide supporting funds. One of the most successful examples of an 
international agency’s role as a broker and facilitator of regional cooperation involves 
bilateral relations between Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic. With the help of the 
Asian Development Bank, the two countries signed a cross-border agreement on 15
th 
November 1999 to ease the movement of people, goods and vehicles across the 
common border. To try to ensure that this does not become just another paper 
agreement, implementation has been given a contractual basis by writing it into the 
conditions of the ADB loans and technical assistance grants to the two countries for the 
Almaty-Bishkek regional road rehabilitation project. Among its terms, the cross-border 
agreement provides exemption from export and import duties on transit trade, attempts 
to standardize customs documentation and procedures, and brings truck weights and 
dimensions as well as vehicle inspection and clearance procedures on to a common 
basis. Bilateral relations between the two countries were the most cordial in Central 
Asia and may have been sufficiently good to achieve these goals without external 
assistance and the coverage of the cross-border agreement is limited, but nevertheless 
the ADB’s intervention at a minimum accelerated the process of regional cooperation to 
facilitative transit. 
6 Conclusions 
This paper analyses why it has been difficult to coordinate aid for projects which require 
regional cooperation and whose economic benefits appear to be so clearly positive. 
After setting out the background and history of aid provision to the Central Asian 
countries which became independent in 1991, the paper analyses the interests—both 
real and perceived—of major players: aid donors, national governments and groups 
within countries. Much bilateral aid has been viewed through the zero-sum prism of 
geopolitical competition, and individual donors have shown little interest in promoting 
                                                 
64 In practice, despite a convention of not criticizing other international organization, there is also 
competition among the external bodies, with the ADB, for example, favouring CAREC as a vehicle 
for regional cooperation on trade matters. 31 
regional cooperation. Geopolitical considerations have also characterized the 
proliferation of regional trade agreements, and have prevented regional organizations 
from effectively addressing region-wide issues such as transit. 
Multilateral agencies have an opportunity to promote regional cooperation by offering 
technical advice and support, by acting as an honest broker in negotiations, and by 
providing funding to compensate losers or to reduce other obstacles. The initial steps in 
Central Asia during the 1990s were unsuccessful because the reputation for impartial 
advice was tarnished by the IMF’s position on the ruble zone (i.e., by assuming a strong 
company line on a topic where the appropriate advice was unclear) and because the 
World Bank’s regional focus was on an important but in the circumstances intractable 
regional problem (desiccation of the Aral Sea). Other multilateral economic agencies 
arrived on the scene later and took time to establish a presence and create an identity. 
The prospects for coordinating multilateral aid for regional cooperation are improving 
in the twenty-first century. Donor cooperation in the CIS-7 initiative of aid for the 
poorest CIS countries (which include the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) 
was a step towards institutional coordination although the prospects for regional 
cooperation within this framework are hindered by the composition of the   
CIS-7 which does not include Turkmenistan or Kazakhstan. The ADB has been 
designated as the lead institution on matters of transport and transit and cooperated with 
the UNDP in an analysis of regional cooperation on trade, transport and transit, which 
placed a strong emphasis on national involvement (UNDP 2005; ADB 2006). These 
studies have highlighted the potential win-win outcomes which exist for regional 
cooperation in trade facilitation and made a first attempt to calculate the gains from 
regional cooperation. 
What lessons can be drawn from the experience of coordinating aid for regional 
cooperation in Central Asia? To date, the results have been disappointing, indicating 
pitfalls to avoid in a region where the potential benefits from cooperation are large. A 
key role for aid donors is to provide technical assistance in analysing and explaining 
benefits, and how these affect the various interests—a role which requires establishment 
of a reputation for honest-dealing and technical competence. Donors may facilitate 
implementation by providing financial assistance although, as illustrated by the Aral Sea 
programmes of 1992-97, this alone is unlikely to be sufficient to promote regional 
cooperation when the national governments are unconvinced of the benefits. A better 
strategy in the context of national jealousies and suspicions is to start with less 
contentious areas for cooperation, especially if it is possible to identify win-win 
situations, as in areas of transit and trade facilitation. 32 
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